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China's Road-map for Regional Cooperation: Building a Community of Shared Future in the South China Sea

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Abstract: The South China Sea (SCS) has long been mired in historical disputes and rising geopolitical tensions, making innovative frameworks necessary to foster regional stability. This article introduces the Community of Shared Future (CSF), China's strategic roadmap to transform the SCS from a contested space into a zone of cooperation. Rooted in mutual benefit and multilateralism, the CSF emphasizes joint resource management, economic integration, and conflict de-escalation. Deep-rooted issues, such as colonial legacies, resource competition, and contests between nations, have exacerbated regional disputes. Furthermore, post-2016 militarization by claimants has hindered resolution efforts. The CSF counters zero-sum logics by prioritizing shared interests, such as temporarily suspending sovereignty claims, promoting joint fisheries and energy ventures, and embedding cooperative norms in ASEAN dialogues. A key component of this vision is leveraging China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to promote infrastructure development, marine conservation, and tourism. Indonesia's pragmatic approach to balancing sovereignty and economic

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cooperation offers a model for other littoral states. However, obstacles remain, including persistent distrust among ASEAN members and external interference. The success of the CSF is contingent upon the implementation of a multifaceted, interconnected framework by policymakers. This implementation must encompass the following five pillars: (1) the facilitation of diplomatic consensus-building through bilateral and ASEAN dialogues, (2) the promotion of economic integration via revenue-sharing and BRI-backed projects, (3) the coordination of security measures to mitigate militarization, (4) the enhancement of legal and diplomatic frameworks, and (5) the establishment of a new maritime security forum or secretariat for the SCS. By conceptualizing the SCS as a “common home” rather than a site of conflict, the CSF aligns with ASEAN’s developmental agenda while accommodating China’s strategic imperatives. This approach ultimately positions the SCS as a potential exemplar for global maritime governance probably.

Keywords: South China Sea; Community of Shared Future; ASEAN; Belt and Road Initiative; dispute resolution; China

1. Introduction

What strategies does the Chinese government employ to foster regional cooperation in the South China Sea (SCS)? Disputes in the SCS have historically been regarded as a sensitive topic among regional countries. Since 2016, the situation in the SCS has undergone intermittent escalation, particularly with the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., repeatedly attributing responsibility to China for various issues, including “environmental degradation [1].” The Philippines is not an isolated case. Indeed, over the years, countries in the region have adopted a more robust approach in addressing disputes in the SCS. Vietnam has been increasing its efforts to construct military outposts in the SCS, a move that has led to concerns regarding the presence of military forces in the area. Vietnam claims the islands, rocks, shoals, and vast resources in the SCS, further complicating the geopolitical dynamics of the region [2]. One of the major external forces, the United States (U.S.), has also been a source of disruption. During President Marco’s term, the U.S. and the Philippines have significantly expanded and institutionalized their military cooperation. This collaborative endeavor has reached a stage where the U.S. has decided to deploy intermediate-range missile systems in the Philippines without consulting or even informing other countries in the region [3]. With respect to the SCS disputes and the prospect of a regional arms race, scholars in the field of international relations have expressed a generally pessimistic outlook. The resolution of these disputes is being called into question by some observers [4,5], who posit that the problem will only worsen with Donald J. Trump serving his second term as U.S. president [6,7].

Although the situation in the SCS seems pessimistic at first glance, this research argues that it is possible to establish a Community of Shared Future (CSF) in the SCS through trust building and joint efforts. The CSF is characterized by inclusiveness, cooperation, interdependence, sustainability,

and harmony. This is China's solution for addressing, mitigating, and ultimately resolving the tensions in the region. It is also a comprehensive roadmap for regional stability and win-win cooperation.

2.How Did We Get Here?

From a historical perspective, the subject known as the SCS issue can be regarded as a political construct. Prior to the 1960s, the SCS was not a primary concern in the region. With the exception of the South Vietnamese regime's claim over the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), other countries, including North Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, demonstrated a relatively indifferent stance regarding the SCS. These countries refrained from asserting claims or undertaking substantial actions in this region. The emergence of the SCS issue can be traced back to the 1970s, when the newly unified Vietnam, the Philippines, and other littoral states began to deploy military forces to occupy the islands and reefs within the SCS, concurrently asserting territorial claims. The emergence and escalation of the SCS issue is attributable to three major dynamics: colonialism, strategic competition between nations, and resource competition.

2.1 Colonialism

The ongoing challenges faced by the countries in the region are deeply intertwined with the historical and socio-political influences of colonialism, particularly in the context of the SCS issue. The name SCS - Nanhai [8] is first documented in the Classic of Poetry [9], a literary work compiled during the Spring and Autumn period in China. Beginning in the 5th century, subsequent Chinese dynasties witnessed an increased level of documentation of the SCS and its islands in geographical and literary works. This phenomenon can be attributed to the systematization of maritime knowledge through navigational practices and the further development of relations between China and Southeast Asia, which culminated in the "seven voyages" of Zheng He during the Ming dynasty [10]. Indeed, according to British historian Anthony Carty, upon the arrival of the British in the SCS, it was observed that the fishermen inhabiting the islands were almost exclusively Chinese. The origins of the disputes in the SCS can be traced to the 1930s, when Western colonial powers intruded into what had until then been an undisturbed Chinese homeland. A review of U.S. diplomatic archives reveals that during the 1940s, the American government deliberately disregarded its own hydrographic records and recommendations from international legal expert committees. The government prioritized the exclusion of China from the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands) [11] and Nansha Islands. These deliberate manoeuvres transformed the SCS from a historically peaceful and cooperative region that benefited regional nations into a state of artificial controversies, frictions, and confrontations [12]. In this regard, colonialism must be regarded as the fundamental cause of the problem.

Among the Western colonial powers, France also exerted a considerable influence on the matter. In the 1930s, a series of events known in China as “the Nine Small Islands Incident” [13,14] paved the way for the French occupation of a significant portion of the SCS. In 1939, Japan occupied Hainan Island and subsequently assumed control of nearly the entire South China Sea. In the aftermath of Japan’s defeat in 1945, China, operating in accordance with the provisions established by the Cairo Declaration of 1943 [15] and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 [16], deployed warships to assert its authority within the SCS. However, the newly independent Vietnam asserts its right to inherit islands and reefs that were previously under French control, citing its status as the successor state of French Indochina. The Philippines, in contrast, asserts that Japan relinquished its sovereignty over certain features in the SCS in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty [17]. However, Japan did not specify the recipient of these features. Consequently, the Philippines asserts that it acquired these islands, reefs, and shoals based on the “doctrine of discovery [18].”

2.2 Strategic Competition between Nations

From a geopolitical perspective, the SCS is of tremendous strategic importance. The waterway under consideration is of significant importance due to its high volume of maritime traffic and its role as a strategic corridor for naval activities and military transport. This phenomenon has been referred to by French historian François Gipouloux as “the Asian Mediterranean [19].” Prior to World War II, the region’s strategic importance, owing to its proximity to continental Asia, led to intense competition among the major global powers, including the British Empire, the Dutch Empire, and France. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union and the U.S. engaged in a competition for military dominance in the SCS. The competition initially manifested in the presence of the U.S. at the Subic Naval Base, which was withdrawn in 1991, and subsequently with Russia’s departure from Cam Ranh Bay in 2002. In the wake of the “pivot to Asia” strategy articulated by the former U.S. President Barack H. Obama, the U.S. has been progressively augmenting its military presence and political influence within the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, as the competition between China and the U.S. has intensified, the SCS has once again emerged as a theater for great power conflict.

The predominant scholarly consensus in China holds that prior to the U.S.’s strategic “pivot,” the SCS and adjacent islands held limited strategic significance in American geopolitical calculation. As China’s comprehensive national power has grown systemically, the U.S. has increasingly incorporated these islands into its “island chain strategy,” leveraging them as geo-strategic pressure points to obstruct China’s peaceful development.

2.3 Resource Competition

The SCS is characterized by a wealth of resources, including substantial fish stocks, oil and natural gas reserves, which contribute to the region's economic and strategic importance. These resources have also been a catalyst for intensified resource competitions in the region. Firstly, the SCS is a vital source of animal protein for Southeast Asia's densely populated regions, which allows for extensive fishing activities. The region's fishery resources are predominantly comprised of commercially valuable species, such as tuna, mackerel, croaker, and anchovy. In addition, crustaceans, including shrimp, crabs, and shellfish, contribute substantially to the overall yield. Secondly, the SCS basin is home to substantial oil and natural gas reserves. The primary hydrocarbon production areas are concentrated in three strategic locations: the northern waters of Borneo, the eastern continental shelf of the Malay Peninsula, and the northwestern continental slope of Palawan Island. These regions have been identified as having commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits [20–22]. It is imperative to acknowledge that certain littoral countries engage in strategic competition over resources and vital shipping lanes, not solely for economic benefits, but also for the purpose of asserting their territorial claims.

2.4 Intertwined Relationship

The three drivers previously delineated are not isolated phenomena; rather, they constitute an interlocking causal nexus. Firstly, the establishment of a historical baseline of overlap is facilitated by the use of colonial constructs. The colonial powers employed a variety of legal rationales, including French "protectorate" extensions, Japanese wartime annexations, and British mapping of customary waters into formal jurisdictions. The result was a patchwork of overlapping claims. In the aftermath of the war, the stipulations of various post-war treaties have resulted in the ambiguous status of certain islands' ownership. This ambiguity has resulted in the persistence of plausible historical narratives among various claimant parties, which can be mobilized when strategic or economic incentives coincide. Secondly, external powers have exploited these colonial ambiguities to justify their naval presence. For instance, the U.S.'s strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region, dubbed the "pivot to Asia," includes deliberately selecting features within its allies' claimed zones to carry out "freedom of navigation" operations. This approach serves to reinforce the U.S.'s commitment while simultaneously exerting a subtle pressure on all claimants to consolidate their positions. Some littoral states, emboldened by the patronage of major global powers, have engaged in the transformation of reefs and atolls into miniature outposts, thereby converting legal claims into physical nodes of control. Thirdly, resource conflicts have been known to rekindle strategic and historical tensions. It has been observed that low-intensity confrontations have the potential to rapidly escalate into diplomatic crises. Such escalation can result in show-of-force patrols by both disputants and their external supporters. Once an island has been militarized by an occupying power, that

power invokes effective administration as a means of bolstering its legal claims. This, in turn, prompts a reciprocal response from neighboring states. The convergence of overlapping colonial legacies, external power engagement, and resource imperatives ultimately gives rise to a cycle of claim, counter-claim, exploitation, and escalation. This cycle, in turn, perpetuates mistrust, undermines regional stability, and hinders the development of a cooperative management approach for the SCS.

3. The Way Forward

The CSF is a visionary framework proposed by the Chinese leadership to foster global and regional cooperation, emphasizing interdependence, mutual respect, and collective prosperity in addressing common challenges. The text is founded on the principles of inclusive development and win-win cooperation. It advocates for strengthened multilateral partnerships across economic, security, and cultural spheres. These partnerships should transcend geopolitical rivalries and zero-sum mentalities. The concept prioritizes dialogue over confrontation, shared benefits over unilateral gains, and sustainable development over exploitation. The objective is to unite nations in addressing transnational issues such as climate change, pandemics, and regional conflicts [23]. Despite the reservations expressed by Western scholars regarding the efficacy of the CSF and the authenticity of its underlying intentions [24,25], it is noteworthy that China has not engaged in warfare for over 35 years, even as the U.S. endeavors, through peaceful means or other means, to contain its peaceful rise.

Although a CSF in the SCS has not yet been formalized as China's foreign policy, the concept itself offers a comprehensive framework for addressing the region's complexities. Furthermore, parallel initiatives—such as the China-ASEAN Community of Shared Future and the Maritime Community with a Shared Future—are already embedded in China's strategic blueprint, creating the necessary conditions and timely opportunity to extend this approach to the SCS. The authors posit that regional states—including China, the Philippines, and others—could shift from confrontation to cooperation by prioritizing shared interests over unilateral claims.

3.1 *Logic of CSF in the SCS*

In layman's terms, the CSF in the SCS could be defined as an interdependent geographical space in which SCS littoral states value peace and development rather than conflict and confrontation. From a theoretical perspective, the concept of CSF for mankind shares important affinities with theories of international relations and conflict resolution yet exhibits marked transcendent qualities. The "shared future" framework, in accordance with the tenets of liberal traditional international relations theory, underscores the mutual dependencies among states, whether they pertain to economics, security, or other domains [26]. While interdependence alone does not ensure peace, it constitutes a significant component for its establishment. As

shared understandings of fundamental norms have increased, the average level of violence used has decreased [27]. Conflict resolution theory similarly emphasizes the resolution of disputes through cooperation rather than confrontation, aligning with the “win-win” spirit of the “shared future” concept [28]. Conversely, traditional international relations theories conceptualize the nation-state as the fundamental unit [29]. In contrast, the “shared future” approach situates its primary subject in “humanity” itself, thereby transcending national and ethnic boundaries to prioritize the common welfare of all people. Conflict resolution tends to address particular disputes on a case-by-case basis; by contrast, the shared-destiny vision proposes systemic, holistic solutions.

The CSF in the SCS is characterized by three interrelated yet disparate dynamics: geoeconomics, geopolitics, and geoculture. Firstly, the geoeconomics of the SCS are defined by shared economic interests among littoral states and a high degree of interdependence between them. Since the 21st century, amid the rapid economic growth experienced in East Asia, economic and trade relations between China and ASEAN nations have also undergone significant acceleration. Despite the presence of competitive aspects within the manufacturing sector, as well as in foreign investment and export markets, the economies of the two parties exhibit complementarity in the domains of natural resources, agricultural products, timber goods, and steel. Evidence suggests that China has maintained its status as the primary trade partner of ASEAN for the past 15 years, concurrently assuming a pivotal role in the realm of direct investment [29]. Secondly, the geopolitics in the SCS are characterized by low-level security cooperation within confrontation. The SCS’s geo-strategic importance has led to competition among powers outside the region, including the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan. In the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific region, countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have adopted a strategic approach aimed at balancing the influence of major powers. This strategy involves the promotion of the internationalization of the SCS dispute, with the objective of maximizing their own interests in the context of regional dynamics. In this context, China is endeavoring to establish a novel geopolitical framework, one that prioritizes cooperation over confrontation. Following the establishment of the China-ASEAN dialogue mechanism in 1991, there has been an increase in geopolitical and security collaboration in the SCS. In 2001, China’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) led to the establishment of multi-tiered dialogue mechanisms encompassing leaders, ministers, and senior officials. In 2021, China and ASEAN established a “strategic partnership,” which led to a substantial enhancement in China-ASEAN relations. Thirdly, the geoculture in the SCS requires further improvement. It is imperative for littoral countries to cultivate a shared cultural identity within the SCS, one that fosters collective resilience in the face of shared challenges, including maritime delimitation, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, counter-piracy, marine disaster

mitigation and prevention, and fishery resource development. As scholars have argued, enhancing the geo-cultural friendliness and inclusiveness of the region could better mitigate the SCS disputes than improving the political relations between littoral countries [30].

In summary, among the primary dynamics in the SCS, geoeconomics demonstrates considerable strength, while geoculture exhibits notable deficiencies. However, the construction of a CSF within the SCS might employ the “spill-over mechanism” proposed by neo-functionalist Ernst B. Haas. According to Haas, transnational cooperation centered on functional needs could generate political momentum for the development of supranational entities through institutionalized development and subsequent “spillover” into political domains [31,32]. In the context of the SCS, initial collaboration in low-sensitivity areas—such as joint fisheries management, trade and investment, and disaster response mechanisms—has the potential to cultivate transnational trust through technical problem-solving. This process can convert functional dependency into shared norms or even identity.

3.2 Building SCS as a Testing Ground for CSF

It is posited that China and other littoral states could employ the concept of CSF to address the substantial issues facing the region while deferring their disputes. Furthermore, it is recommended that they construct the SCS as a testing ground for the CSF. It is further recommended that the SCS be constructed as a testing ground for the CSF. It has been demonstrated that initiatives—where sovereignty disputes are less contentious—have the potential to demonstrate the tangible value of the CSF. From a political standpoint, such cooperation could be regarded as an embodiment of the CSF. Demonstrating to China, Southeast Asian countries, and the global community that the SCS has the potential to evolve into a “sea of cooperation” rather than a “sea of confrontation” would be a significant development. This would enable China and regional states to cultivate practical, incremental collaboration in areas that are mutually beneficial.

In accordance with the provisions stipulated in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN member states have collectively established three specialized technical committees. Each of these committees has been assigned a pivotal area of maritime collaboration. The primary objective of the first of these committees is to ensure the safety of navigation and to coordinate search and rescue operations across the disputed waters. This enhances mutual trust and reduces the risk of accidental incidents at sea. The second committee is devoted to countering transnational crimes in maritime domains. The third committee convenes scientific experts and environmental specialists to promote marine research, monitor oceanographic conditions, and encourage ecosystem protection. This

collaborative effort reflects the mutual commitment of China and ASEAN member states to the sustainable utilization of marine resources.

Beyond the realm of environmental cooperation, the DOC process has also contributed to the advancement of security cooperation. A notable development was the initiation of the China–ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund in 2011 by China, which allocated an initial RMB 3 billion as seed capital. Over the years, the fund has provided financial support to a variety of prominent projects, with the objective of enhancing regional resilience and ecological stewardship. One such initiative is the Southeast Asia Marine Environment Forecasting and Disaster Early Warning System, which integrates ocean observations and data sharing to provide timely alerts of storms, tsunamis, and other marine hazards.

Beyond these scientific and environmental initiatives, the DOC process has also yielded breakthrough progress in maritime security cooperation. In an effort to enhance their collaborative responses to oil spills, member states have engaged in joint exercises. Furthermore, they have conducted search-and-rescue drills and multilateral meetings to align legal frameworks governing conduct at sea. Through these combined efforts, including technical committee work, funded cooperation projects, and security exercises, China and ASEAN have steadily built a practical foundation for trust and stability in the SCS. This development has laid the groundwork for more ambitious agreements in the years ahead [33,34]. Initiatives and advancements have the potential to cultivate operational trust, thereby demonstrating that collaboration can yield greater benefits than zero-sum competition.

3.3 Transforming SCS into a Pilot Zone for Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a pragmatic conduit for realizing the CSF's vision, promoting inclusive development and multilateral collaboration across continents while operationalizing this global governance philosophy through tangible infrastructure, trade, and cultural exchanges. This initiative aims to strengthen economic and cultural ties across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. It does so by building infrastructure networks, expanding trade corridors, and fostering multilateral cooperation for shared prosperity. In this regard, China and other littoral states could maximize the benefits of the BRI by strategically aligning national development priorities with BRI projects, leveraging infrastructure investments to bridge connectivity gaps, and fostering cross-border synergies.

The following three aspects illustrate how the BRI can be strategically leveraged to achieve regional objectives. Firstly, the SCS possesses the potential to function as a pilot zone for the BRI, thereby contributing to the cultivation of a trade and investment-oriented geoculture. The SCS is a vital passage for the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and holds significant strategic importance. As of June 2023, China had signed Belt and Road

cooperation documents with 152 countries and 32 international organizations worldwide. The country's trade in goods with partners participating in the Belt and Road Initiative witnessed a substantial expansion, rising from USD 1.04 trillion in 2013 to USD 2.07 trillion in 2022. Bilateral trade between China and ASEAN reached USD 982.3 billion in 2024 [35]. Secondly, it is evident that China cannot afford to take the risk of engaging in a regional conflict due to the geoeconomic significance of the SCS. Approximately 50,000 merchant ships and nearly 50% of oil tankers pass through the SCS each year. Crude oil entering the SCS route via the Malacca Strait accounts for nearly 60% of China's total imports [36]. The economic and trade relations among the littoral states are becoming increasingly close. The SCS's coastal states play host to several BRI flagship projects, including Indonesia's Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, Malaysia's East Coast Rail Link, Brunei's Temburong Bridge, Vietnam's Hanoi Light Rail Line No. 2, the Philippines' Kaliwa Dam, and the Chiquita River Pump Station irrigation scheme. In essence, the integration of the BRI with the CSF holds the potential for Southeast Asian countries to enhance regional connectivity, facilitate infrastructure upgrades, and promote inclusive development. Thirdly, China-Indonesia relations provided a practical example of implementing the SCS for a "win-win" geopolitical outcome. China and Indonesia have demonstrated a mutual understanding of their economic interests and have concentrated on activities that are complementary and beneficial to both parties. This approach encourages the other party to prioritize moderation and discretion in the management of disputes. However, Indonesia recognizes that its own deterrence capabilities alone are insufficient to secure tacit stability and has chosen to deepen security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries like Australia, Japan, Canada, and the U.S., as well as neighboring countries such as Malaysia, to counterbalance China's military strength [37].

4. Multifaceted Challenges

The pursuit of CSF in the SCS faces multifaceted challenges rooted in historical, political, and psychological factors. If these challenges remain unresolved, the SCS could see an increase in tensions that would threaten the security and economic stability of the Asia-Pacific region. This is because states would prioritize unilateral defense postures over cooperative frameworks, raising the likelihood of accidental clashes or prolonged standoffs. The following three challenges must be addressed: Firstly, the SCS is not equipped with a stabilization system. In recent years, progress toward a cohesive Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS has faced significant hurdles. In addition, the Philippines has adopted a new approach by pursuing a regional COC that excludes China. The present state of affairs in the SCS demonstrates a conspicuous absence of a cohesive stabilization system with the capacity to manage escalating disputes. Secondly, the struggle for power

in the SCS is a salient factor. The U.S. is pursuing a policy of militarizing the SCS and is attempting to counter the regional cooperation with a “U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia-Canada” mini-lateral cooperation. In addition, the U.S. is collaborating with Japan and Australia, among other nations, through a trilateral framework to augment military security assistance to the Philippines. This initiative is aimed at containing China within the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, certain scholars posit that these measures are defensible. These scholars assert that China’s sustained efforts to “assert control” over disputed maritime areas through so-called “forceful naval deployments” have somewhat intensified the region’s geopolitical rivalry [38]. Thirdly, there is an increasing deficit of trust. A prevailing perspective among observers of the SCS issue is the existence of a “trust deficit” among the littoral countries of the SCS. Disputes in the SCS are susceptible to the influence of populist sentiments. Moreover, the populace of Southeast Asia has been observed to experience a sense of apprehension regarding the prospect of being compelled to “pick a side [39].” The geopolitical dynamics between China and Southeast Asian countries are susceptible to fluctuations. If this deficit is not addressed, it risks entrenching cycles of hostility, paralyzing multilateral solutions, and empowering external interference.

5. Conclusions

Notwithstanding the daunting challenges that lie ahead, cooperation among littoral states has already yielded significant progress, as evidenced by its growing regional influence. China continues to function as the predominant economic and diplomatic authority in the region. A salient finding of the survey was the preference of ASEAN nations for China as a major power partner in the event of being compelled to choose, with 50.5% of respondents expressing this preference. This marks the first instance in the survey’s history that China has surpassed the U.S. in this regard. This preference is evident in ASEAN member states such as Malaysia (75.1%), Indonesia (73.2%), Laos (70.6%), and Brunei (70.1%), which share a common thread: their economies and citizens have derived substantial benefits from BRI and robust bilateral trade and investment ties [40]. It is imperative to acknowledge the growing recognition of China’s strategy for establishing the CSF within the Southeast Asian region. A survey revealed that 31.3% of respondents acknowledged the congruence between the CSF and the ASEAN’s developmental objectives [40].

In order to ensure lasting stability in the SCS and foster prosperity across the Asia-Pacific, governments must continue to prioritize this collaborative initiative on their policy agendas. It is incumbent upon both policymakers and scholars to actively contribute to the advancement of this initiative, recognizing its potential to transform regional tensions into opportunities for shared growth and mutual trust. To that end, it is imperative that more substantial actions be taken to build a CSF in the SCS.

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